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Abstract
This paper describes a novel approach for the
flexible development of dependable automation services
applied to a case study taken from requirements of
energy automation systems. It shows first how the
use of a custom compositional recovery language
can be exploited to achieve a flexible and dependable
functionality in software. Then it is shown how
modeling techniques based on Petri nets can be used
to assess the properties that different configurations of
the addressed service can achieve.
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1. Introduction
The target application domain, from which the case
study of the present contribution has been derived,
concerns the automation of the Electric Power System
(EPS) in charge of producing, transporting and dis-
tributing electricity. An EPS is characterised by a com-
plex network topology whose nodes of interconnection
are High Voltage Substations, Primary and Secondary
Substations connected by high and medium voltage
lines. Energy automation systems have a hierarchical
organisation: they perform mission-critical automation
functions (such as monitoring, command/control and
protection) requiring different degrees of dependabil-
ity, depending on their criticality degree (influence and
propagation of faults affecting the functions, possibil-
ity and cost of confinement). The availability required
by a function depends on its positioning within the
hierarchical structure of the automation system: the
highest is the function, the highest degree of availabil-
ity is required; for what concerns credibility (integrity
and security), the lowest is the position of the func-
tion, the highest is the required credibility, i.e. the
closest to the field, the most serious the consequences.
Dependability needs of automation systems in the elec-
tric power domain have been traditionally addressed by
realising custom hardware-based devices, which are ca-
pable of guaranteeing high availability and integrity to
the automation function. The evolution of the future
generation systems, belonging to different automation
levels, requires parallel and distributed implementa-
tions on a variety of scaleable high performance and
fault tolerant architectures, capable to answer to the
increasing demand for performance and dependability
coming from the application field, while preserving the
previous investments [7]. An emerging challenge in the
development of dependable systems is represented by
the availability of generic software-based fault toler-
ance capabilities, which are portable on COTS compo-
nents and easily adaptable to different configurations
of the same application, as well as to different appli-
cations and domains. In the ESPRIT project TIRAN
this challenge has been tackled by developing a flexible
approach which has been ported and demonstrated on
different COTS platforms [3]. This paper mainly de-
scribes how a component of the approach, the language
Ariel, may be used to provide a specific and robust fault




















satisfying dependability requirements typical of a wide
class of applications in the energy domain. The be-
haviour of alternative Ariel implementations of the Re-
dundant Watchdog is then modelled with Stochastic
Petri Nets and some preliminary results from the eval-
uation of models are given. The structure of the paper
is as follows. First, the application requirements for
a Watchdog mechanisms and the characteristics of a
Redundant Watchdog functionality are introduced in
Section 2. Next, in Section 3, the Ariel language is in-
troduced and specific differences with respect to similar
approaches are pointed out. Sections 4 and 5 respec-
tively explain how the Ariel language can be used to
realise the Redundant Watchdog and provide potential
users with some preliminary results from the evalua-
tion of Stochastic Petri Nets models. Finally, Section
6 concludes this contribution summarising the current
achievements and the future extensions.
2. An Industrial Problem: The Redun-
dant Watchdog Requirements
Technicians of energy automation systems typically
express requirements in textual form, capturing the
main dependability needs of the applications. Consid-
ering the Primary Substation Automation System a list
of dependability requirements has been collected and
addressed in the TIRAN project [2]. In the present pa-
per we will focus on two of those Application Require-
ments (referred as AR1 and AR2 below) that lead to
the need of an enhanced watchdog mechanism. They
are formulated as follows:
AR1 : “If an erroneous situation can not be recov-
ered according to required mode and within given
time constraints, then a mechanism for the auto-
exclusion of the system should be provided which,
if not reset before the expiration of a pre-fixed
time-out, disconnects the system from the plant,
leaving the plant in an acceptable state, forcing
the output to assume a pre- defined secure con-
figuration, providing appropriate signalling to the
operator and to the remote systems (as automa-
tion system failures should not affect the plant).”
AR2 : “The auto-exclusion should guarantee a high
availability, integrity and security - e.g. by a re-
dundant and periodically tested mechanism, with
auto-diagnostics.”
The auto-exclusion functionality (as required by
AR1 and AR2) has been traditionally supported by
the so-called plant’s watchdog (plantWD) mechanism,
a dedicated hardware device with high integrity and
availability degrees. In most cases the plantWD mech-
anism is used as an ultimate action of a fault tolerant
strategy to detect un-recovered processing errors and to
avoid their propagation. Errors are typically run-time
violations occurring during the execution of an appli-
cation process due to, e.g., a process that has crashed
or is slowed down.
The watchdog mechanism (WD) cyclically sets a
timer requiring an application process to explicitly re-
set it by sending an “I am alive” message before it
reaches its deadline. If, for any reason, the application
process is not able to send the message, the watchdog
raises an error condition that has to be treated by some
entity in some way. Depending on the global fault tol-
erance strategy adopted our plantWD is set to count
either the double of or the same time of the basic ap-
plication cycle.
In support of the migration to flexible software de-
pendability services running on COTS platforms, the
goal of developing a robust, software-based WD mech-
anism has been addressed by the TIRAN Project. A
watchdog basic tool has been implemented charac-
terised by the following Watchdog Requirements (WR)
and Properties (WP):
WR1 : “The WD has to survive at system reboot or
reset, i.e. the memory it allocates for its counter
is not to be cleared.”
WR2 : “In a distributed software architecture the ap-
plication node’s signals have to be put in a logic
AND to actually signal the WD, i.e. the WD ef-
fectively stops to countdown only if on each node
the execution has terminated correctly.”
WR3 : “The WD has to survive at node failures, i.e.
whatever node faults the WD mechanism should
be not compromised.”
WR4 : In order to guarantee correct operation of the
WD mechanism, it is mandatory that the WD task
is running at a higher priority than the tasks (that
run on the same node) it supervises. WD tasks su-
pervising tasks on other nodes must have appro-
priate priority to ensure proper operation. It is
the responsibility of the application writer to en-
sure correct partitioning and priority allocation.
WP1 : The watchdog task can be placed either on the
same node where the application tasks run on or
on a different node.
WP2 : Placing the watchdog task on the same node
where the application task runs on minimises over-
head and detection latency.
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WP3 : Placing the watchdog task on a different node
with respect to the application node lowers the
probability of a common failure for both applica-
tion and watchdog task that would go undetected.
WP4 : Detection latency is under the control of the
application writer. The higher the frequency of
sending “I’m alive” messages, the lower the detec-
tion latency.
WP5 : Overhead is under the control of the applica-
tion writer. The lower the frequency of sending
“I’m alive” messages, the lower the overhead paid
by the application task and the communication
system.
WP6 : WD is just one task which receives system
clock ticks and application “I’m alive” messages.
Both types of messages are received through in-
terprocess communication and are asynchronous
to WD task.
WP7 : Being the WD in a distributed software archi-
tecture it is able to receive multiple signals and to
apply a logical operation on them (i.e. in the case
of the logical operation AND required by WR1 the
WD will fire if at least one node does not produce
its signal).
In section 4 it will be shown how the requirement WR3
above may be fulfilled by instantiating more WD mech-
anisms and by applying different voting mechanisms
to their firings. Such Redundant WatchDog (RWD)
mechanism is characterised by the following design
properties:
RWP1 : Processing errors affecting WD replicas can
be detected and recovered transparently by the
RWD
RWP2 : The number of WD replicas and the voting
mechanism chosen determine a different improve-
ment of the RWD dependability: e.g. Nreplica=3,
allows a 2-out-of-3 voting (which can correct up
to 1 fault); the selection of the suitable Nreplica
and voting is a compromise among dependability
and performance overhead, left to the application
writer’s experience.
RWP3 : WD replicas can be placed all on the same
node. This minimises overhead and detection la-
tency but does not increase the RWD dependabil-
ity.
RWP4 : WD replicas can be placed on different
nodes. This minimises the chance of a common
failure affecting each WD replica.
In section 5 the analysis of Stochastic Petri Nets
models of alternative RWD policies will prove the prop-
erties WP2 and RWP2 above. The comparison of the
computed performance measures provides asensitivity
indication of the requirement AR2 to the number of
WD replicas.
3. The Ariel Language
Ariel [5] is a recovery, configuration and coordina-
tion language that has been defined inside the TIRAN
project. By recovery language (RL) we mean a lin-
guistic framework for the expression of the error recov-
ery aspects of a distributed application [5, 6]. Accord-
ing to this approach, beside the service language, i.e.,
the programming language addressing the functional
design concerns, a special-purpose linguistic structure
(the RL) is available to address error recovery and re-
configuration in an attempt to minimize non-functional
code intrusion and hence to improve the separation
between the functional and the fault-tolerance design
concerns. To some extent this allows to decompose the
design process into two distinct phases, thus providing
a way to control the design complexity and to reduce
coding times. RL programs are executed either asyn-
chronously with the user application, when an error de-
tection tool from those in a custom library signals that
an entity has been found in error, or synchronously,
when the application itself declares that has entered
an erroneous state (via instrumented assertions or self-
checking). Examples of entities are: processing nodes,
tasks, group of tasks (called “logicals”). In the RL pro-
totyped in Ariel error recovery is specified in terms of
guarded actions: actions specify recovery activity on
entities of an application and pre-conditions query the
current state of those entities. The state of the entities,
as it appears to the detection tools, is sent to a mid-
dleware entity called Backbone (BB), which arranges
it into the form of a system-wide database. The ex-
ecution of the user-specified recovery actions is done
via a fixed scheme. Together with the application, two
special-purpose tasks are running: the BB task and a
“recovery application” task. As soon as an error is de-
tected, a notification describing that event is sent to the
BB that stores the notification and starts the recovery
application. This means evaluating all the recovery ac-
tions that constitute the RL program. The evaluation
of a recovery action is done as follows: each guard is
translated into a query message for the BB sends back
the truth-value of the guard. When a guard is found to
be true, its corresponding actions are executed, other-
wise they are skipped. Ariel is also a configuration lan-
guage (CFL), that is to say a linguistic framework that
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can be used to reduce to a minimum the code intrusion
necessary to include in the application a set of fault-
tolerance provisions. As an example, the adoption of a
software watchdog requires the user of the service lan-
guage to intrude in the code a number of non-functional
lines of code for the connection, control, and disconnec-
tion of the watchdog service. The CFL programmer
only sees a high level API with which he can configure
a specific instance of a fault-tolerance provision, with
no need of being aware of even which specific software
or hardware tool will be used on the target system to
implement the provision. The third key attribute of
Ariel is that of being a compositional language (CML),
that is, a linguistic framework with which it is possi-
ble to obtain sophisticated mechanisms by putting to-
gether some “building blocks”. In this case, Ariel can
be used as a CML for fast-prototyping what we call
a dependable mechanisms (DM) by weaving together
one or more instances of our fault-tolerance provisions.
DM’s can be defined as high-level software mechanisms
that provide a higher dependability than the one of-
fered by its building blocks—the fault-tolerance provi-
sions. Figure 1 portrays the TIRAN architecture and
its key components. In the following paragraph, we
briefly summarize the specific differences between RL
and other novel approaches.
3.1. Specific Differences with respect to Other Ap-
proaches
Numerous techniques have been devised in the past
to solve the problem of optimal and flexible devel-
opment of dependability services to be embedded in
the application layer of a computer program. In [5],
some of these approaches are critically reviewed and
qualitatively assessed with respect to a set of struc-
tural attributes (separation of design concerns, syntac-
tical adequacy and adaptability). A non-exhaustive
list of the systems and projects implementing these
approaches is also given in the cited reference. In par-
ticular, approaches based on metaobject protocols [10]
(MOPs), FT distributed programming languages [15]
and aspect-oriented programming [11] (AOP) are re-
viewed therein. In the following, we briefly focus on
MOPs and AOP, two of the most effective and elegant
structuring techniques for flexible development of ser-
vices. The main differences between these approaches
and RL are remarked.
3.1.1. Metaobject Protocols
The key idea behind MOPs is that of “opening” the
implementation of the run-time executive of an object-
oriented language like C++ or Java so that the devel-
oper can adopt and program different, custom seman-
tics, adjusting the language to the needs of the user
and to the requirements of the environment. Using
MOPs, the programmer can modify the behavior of
fundamental features like methods invocation, object
creation and destruction, and member access. The key
concept behind MOPs is that of computational reflec-
tion, or the causal connection between a system and a
meta-level description representing structural and com-
putational aspects of that system [13]. An architecture
supporting this approach is FRIENDS [8]. FRIENDS
implemented a number of FT provisions (e.g., repli-
cation, group-based communication, synchronization,
voting) as MOPs.
A number of studies confirm that MOPs reach effi-
ciency in some cases [10], though no experimental or
analytical evidence allows to estimate the practicality
and the applicability of this approach [14, 12]. MOPs
only support object-oriented programming languages
and require special extensions or custom programming
languages.
3.1.2. Aspect-oriented Programming Languages
Aspect-oriented programming [11] is a programming
methodology and a structuring technique that explic-
itly addresses, at system-wide level, the problem of the
best code structure to express different, possibly con-
flicting design goals like for instance high performance,
optimal memory usage, or dependability.
Developed as a Xerox PARC project, AspectJ is
an aspect-oriented extension to the Java programming
language [9, 12]. A study has been carried out on the
capability of AspectJ as an AOP language support-
ing exception detection and handling [12]. It has been
shown how AspectJ can be used to develop so-called
“plug-and-play” exception handlers: libraries of excep-
tion handlers that can be plugged into many differ-
ent applications. This translates into better support
for managing different configurations at compile-time.
Up to now, no AOP tool or programming language ex-
ists for flexible development of dependable services: As-
pectJ only addresses exception detection and handling.
Remarkably enough, the authors of a recent study on
AspectJ and its support to this field conclude [12] that
“whether the properties of AspectJ [documented in this
paper] lead to programs with fewer implementation er-
rors and that can be changed easier, is still an open
research topic that will require serious usability stud-
ies as AOP matures”.
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Figure 1. The TIRAN architecture and its main components.
4. The Redundant Watchdog in Ariel
In order to achieve the Redundant Watchdog func-
tionality described in Section 2 the the full linguis-
tic support (CFL, CML, RL) provided by Ariel has
been exploited to allow the following elements from the
TIRAN architecture to work together: 1) the RTOS
API, and specifically its function TIRAN Send, which
multicasts a message to a logical, 2) the Watchdog,
i.e., a node-local error detection provision, and 3) the
Backbone and its database. The following scenario is
assumed: a distributed system consisting of at least
three nodes N1, N2, and N3, and on each node of this
system, an instance of the TIRAN watchdog is run-
ning. On a fourth node, N4, or on one of the three
watchdog nodes if just three nodes are available, an
application task is running. First of all a configuration
step is needed in order to:
• Define and configure the user application tasks
• Define and configure the Backbone
• Define and configure the three watchdogs, in par-
ticular to assign them the unique-ids W1, W2 and
W3
• Deploy the watchdogs on different nodes and to
state that, on a missed deadline, a notification is
to be sent to the Backbone.
Such a configuration step is coded in the Ariel CFL
as follows:
INCLUDE "watchdogs.h"
TASK 1 = "Backbone0" IS NODE {N1},
TASKID {BACKBONE_TASKID}
TASK 2 = "Backbone1" IS NODE {N2},
TASKID {BACKBONE_TASKID}
TASK 3 = "Backbone2" IS NODE {N3},
TASKID {BACKBONE_TASKID}
TASK {CLIENT} IS NODE {N1}, TASKID {CLIENT}
TASK {W1} IS NODE {N1}, TASKID {W1}
TASK {W2} IS NODE {N2}, TASKID {W2}
TASK {W3} IS NODE {N3}, TASKID {W3}
WATCHDOG {W1} WATCHES {CLIENT}
HEARTBEATS EVERY {BEATCOUNT} MS
ON ERROR WARN BACKBONE
END WATCHDOG
WATCHDOG {W2} WATCHES {CLIENT}
HEARTBEATS EVERY {BEATCOUNT} MS
ON ERROR WARN BACKBONE
END WATCHDOG
WATCHDOG {W3} WATCHES {CLIENT}
HEARTBEATS EVERY {BEATCOUNT} MS
ON ERROR WARN BACKBONE
END WATCHDOG
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The corresponding output is a source file for instan-
tiating three watchdog tasks, identified within the user
application context as tasks W1, W2, W3, watching
correspondent application tasks, with a heartbeat rate
of BEATCOUNT milliseconds and with the default action
of sending a warning message to the backbone task
when a heartbeat is missing. From the user viewpoint,
the only code to be intruded in the source code of
the watched application tasks is given by the macro
HEARTBEAT, which is translated into the commands for
sending a heartbeat message to the watchdog tasks.
Note also that the actual location of the watchdogs is
fully transparent to the application tasks, as the intro-
duction of these details is done in a separate environ-
ment, i.e., the configuration program. A composability
step is then required to define tasks W1, W2 and W3
as the logical L. This is coded in the Ariel CML as
follows:
LOGICAL {L} IS TASK {W1}, TASK {W2}, TASK {W3}
END LOGICAL
Finally there is a recovery step. When a
watched task sends “watchdog L” its heartbeats, the
TIRAN Send function relays these messages to the
three watchdogs on the three nodes. In absence of
faults, the three watchdogs process these messages in
the same way—each of them in particular resets the in-
ternal timer corresponding to the client task that sent
the heartbeat. When a heartbeat does not reach a
watchdog, the watchdog timeout will expire, and the
watchdog sends a notification to the BB that reacts by
wakening the interpreter of Ariel and the r-codes are
interpreted. With different Ariel code we can easily
implement different recovery strategies, and three of
them have been prototyped in TIRAN:
• an “AND-strategy”, that triggers an alarm when
each and every watchdog notifies BB,
• an “OR-strategy”, the alarm is triggered when any
of the three watchdog expires,
• a “2-out-of-3 strategy”, in which a majority of the
watchdogs needs to notify BB in order to trigger
the alarm.
Let us discuss first the AND-strategy, those Ariel
code is shown below:
IF [ PHASE (TASK{W1}) == {EXPIRED} AND
PHASE (TASK{W2}) == {EXPIRED} AND
PHASE (TASK{W3}) == {EXPIRED} ]
THEN
SEND {ALARM} TASK{A}
REMOVE PHASE LOGICAL {L} FROM ERRORLIST
FI
The guard PHASE(TASK{W}j}) refers to the info stored
by the BB in its database: upon each alarm received
by BB from Wj the corresponding phase is set to “ex-
pired”. Therefore the guard evaluates to true only
when all three watchdogs have expired. The action
taken is to reset the phase for the tasks of logical L (ac-
tion REMOVE)and to send an alarm (in the current
prototype, the alarm from the redundant watchdog is
a notification to the task the global identifier of which
is A). The OR strategy can be obtained by changing
the AND operators into OR, and the 2-out-of-3 sim-
ply requires to count if at least two watchdogs are in
phase EXPIRED. The different properties for the three
strategies can then summarized as follows (where the
number in parenthesis will be used later during the
analysis):
• The OR-strategy triggers the alarm as soon as any
of the watchdog expires (o1). This tolerates the
case in which up to two watchdogs have crashed,
or are faulty, or are unreachable (o2). This intu-
itively reduces the probability that missing heart-
beat goes undetected hence can be regarded as an
“integrity-first” strategy (o3). At the same time,
the probability of “false alarms” (mistakenly trig-
gered alarms) is increased (o4). Such alarms possi-
bly lead to temporary pauses of the overall system
service (o5), with possible implications on the ser-
vice costs.
• The AND-strategy, on the other hand, requires
that all the watchdogs reach consensus before trig-
gering the system alarm (a1). It does not toler-
ate a crash of even a single watchdog (a2). It de-
creases the probability of false alarms (a3) but at
the same time decreases the error detection cover-
age of the watchdog BT. It may be regarded as an
“availability-first” strategy. Should be less expen-
sive than OR policy (a4).
• Strategy 2-out-of-3 requires that a majority of
watchdogs expire before the system alarm is ex-
ecuted. Intuitively, this corresponds to a trade-off
between the two above strategies.
5. Modelling
In this section we describe how modelling can be
used to compare the different policies that can be de-
fined using Ariel. Due to lack of space we concentrate
only on the AND and OR policy (the 2-out-of-3 being
an intermediate case), and we only show a few results,
but the process needed for producing additional ones
should be clear enough by the end of the section. From
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the performance and dependability point of view the
most interesting part of the RWD is that concerning
the alarm and the distinction between the alarm hav-
ing expired because of a real failure of the application
(the application is in a halt state) or because of delays
(either in the application or in the communication net-
work), called false alarms. Moreover we have, of course,
to consider the possibility of a fault in any watchdog.
The abstraction level chosen for the analysis assumes
that:
• an application is either working or faulty
• a watchdog is either working or faulty
• an application can get out of a faulty state only if
the watchdog expires
• a watchdog can expire due to the fact that, the
application heartbeat is not received in due time,
or the application controlled by the watchdog is
faulty, or the communication link is broken.
Additional assumptions that have been made are about
communications for which no explicit model is pro-
vided, but the same hypothesis are used in all policies,
as will be explained in the next paragraphs. The mod-
elling formalism used is that of Generalized Stochas-
tic Petri Nets (GSPN) [1] in which transitions are ei-
ther immediate (and they fire in zero time) or timed
(with an associated exponentially distributed delay).
The tool GreatSPN [4] has been used which allows
the computation of performance measures using either
steady state or transient analysis, as well as simulation
(that allows also the solution of models with transitions
that have generally distributed delays, as determinis-
tic, gaussian, etc.) Figure 2 shows the GSPN model
of a redundant watchdog made up of three watchdogs
with OR policy. The model is composed of a skele-
ton application (left portion) and a skeleton watchdog
(right portion). Places starting with Ap are part of
the application model, while places starting with Wd
are part of the watchdog model. Both application and
watchdogs can be faulty, but let us describe first the
normal behaviour. The application performs a compu-
tation (transition activity) and then sends a kick to the
watchdog (actually to the logical that is composed of
three watchdog processes), modelled by transition ok.
The redundancy level of the watchdog is realised by
assigning an initial marking equal to 3 to place Wd1.
In the watchdog, if a heartbeat message arrives before
the timeout expires (that is to say before the firing of
transition timeout), transition ok will fire, removing 3
tokens from Wd1; if instead one of the timeouts ex-
pires before the kick arrives, since we are modelling
the OR policy, transition delayed will fire, to model
the case of an application that is not faulty, but simply
too slow with respect to the chosen value for the time-
out. Observe that this takes substantially into account
also the case of an application that sends the heart-
beat message in time, but the message gets delayed in
the network. The application, or one or more of the
watchdogs, can go into an halting state due to an error
caused by a fault. This is modelled by transition ap-
fault for the application and by transition w-fault for
the watchdogs. As a consequence, it is now possible
that the timeout expires because the application is in
an halting state (place Ap2), and this is modelled by
transition faulty. Another possible scenario is that one
or more watchdogs go into a halting state. In that case
the remaining non-faulty watchdogs still perform their
count-down, unless all of them are faulty (three to-
kens in place Wd3). The GSPN model of a redundant
watchdog made with AND policy differs only in small,
but significant, details: the multiplicity of the arcs from
Wd2 to transitions delayed and faulty is fixed to three,
since all three timeouts should expire before an action
with respect to the application is taken. Moreover it
is possible that, when a heartbeat arrives, some of the
timeouts have already expired, so that also place Wd2
is an input place for transition ok.
The model that has been used for the solution differs
from the one depicted above since we want to consider
a cyclic behaviour, as this is typical of the automa-
tion environment addressed by this work, that is to
say an application that performs an activity and sends
the heartbeat message in an endless loop. A number of
arcs and transitions have been added to the model to
reset back to their initial states the application and the
watchdogs, and an additional delay has been inserted
for this re- cycling activity (transition cycle): this re-
sults in an ergodic model that can be solved in steady
state. Weights have been assigned in a rather blind
(non realistic) manner, since the goal of this prelimi-
nary analysis is to compare the different policies, and
not to produce absolute measures. Transition activity
has a mean delay of 0.5, w-fault and ap-fault a delay
20 times bigger, and the recycling activity is set to 1.0.
The rate of transition timeout has been taken as a vary-
ing parameter from 0.5 to 2.0 (for corrisponding delays
varying from 2.0 to 0.5) To decide which performance
measures to use for the comparison, we can consider
the properties o1– o5 of the OR strategy and a1–a4 of
the AND strategy listed at the end of the previous sec-
tion, and for each property we identify a corresponding
measure to be computed or a property to be proved.
(o1) place Wd2 is always empty
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Figure 2. The redundant watchdog with OR policy.
(o2) there is a state in which delayed o faulty can fire,
although Wd3 is ≥ 2
(o3) throughput of transitions delayed and faulty
(o4) throughput of transition delayed
(o5) throughput of transition activity (useful work)
(a1) structural property due to the weight 3 on the
arc from Wd2 to transitions delayed and faulty,
and we can also check that there is a non null
probability of having 2 tokens in place Wd2.
(a2) existence of a P-invariant stating that the sum
of the tokens in Wd places is equal to 3, therefore
since a fault in a watchdog puts a token in Wd3,
then Wd2 will never have more then 2 tokens, and
therefore delayed and fault will never fire.
(a3) throughput of transition delayed
(a4) throughput of transition activity (useful work)
Properties (o1), (o2) have been proven by inspect-
ing the state space (that contains only a few dozens
states), (a2) has required a P-invariant computation,
while all other properties are based on a comparison
of the throughputs of the transitions activity, delayed
and faulty for the two models, for varying values of the
delay associated with the timeout transition, that are
reported in the diagram of Figure 3 var varying values
of the rate of transition timeout (note that the through-
put of transition faulty has not been shown since too
small for the given choice of parameters, and that we
have also reported the throughput of transitions cycle
and timeout) The throughput of activity shows how
much work is actually performed by the application,
and it is clearly greater for the AND policy. Through-
put of cycle shows that the OR policy causes more
restarts than the AND one, while the throughput of
delayed (marked del in the legenda) shows that OR
sends more false alarms to the backbone than the AND
policy. Finally, the higher throughput of timeout for
the AND policy is due to the fact that the AND pol-
icy has less restart of the watchdogs than the OR one.
Additional analysis is instead needed to show that the
OR policy has a lower “time to detect an application
fault”.
6. Conclusions and Further Develop-
ments
A novel approach for the development of dependable
and flexible automation services has been introduced
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Figure 3. Comparison of AND and OR policies.
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in the project TIRAN and it has been illustrated here
by mean of the redundant watchdog. The approach is
based on the compositional capabilities of Ariel, a cus-
tom language for error recovery and configuration, and
it allows to develop dependable tools whose flexibility
allows the user to easily set up automation services ful-
filling very different dependability requirements. This
flexibility gives more freedom to the dependability de-
signer, that now has to face the problem of comparing
them: in our case study we have used stochastic mod-
elling based on Petri net to achieve such a compari-
son. Summarising, the concept of recovery language al-
lows to express the application software as two separate
codes: the functional code and the r-code. The former
deals with the specification of the functional service,
whereas the latter is the description of the measures
that need to be taken in order to perform some correc-
tive actions, such as ordering the modification of some
key parameter like, for instance, the code redundancy
used in data transmission, or which software process
needs to be appointed to a given sub-task. The speci-
fication of these corrective actions is done by the user
in an environment other than the one for the specifica-
tion of the functional aspects. Furthermore, this sepa-
ration still holds at run-time, since the executable code
and the r-code are physically distinct. This strict sep-
aration between the two aspects may allow to “trade”
at run-time the actual set of recovery actions to be
executed—which may be exploited, for instance, to
provide a mobile code with the required adaptability
to different environment conditions. The reported ap-
proach is currently being further developed and exper-
imented within the recently started IST Project 25434
DepAuDE (Dependability for embedded Automation
systems in Dynamic Environments with intra-site and
inter-site distribution aspects).
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